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SCHOOL BOARD'S EFFORT TO REDUCE DE FACTO
SEGREGATION UPHELD
Balaban v. Rubin
14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1964)
Certain white residents of New York City, whose children were
scheduled to attend new Junior High School 275, instituted a proceeding
to invalidate the zone adopted for the new school by the city's board of
education. The plaintiff-parents maintained that the zone violated section
3201 of the New York Code, the New York Constitution, and the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution because their children
were excluded on racial grounds from school 285, their traditional neigh-
borhood school. The initial zoning map for the new school, the Blodnick
plan," received some community support, but board of education officials
rejected it principally because the plan failed to prevent de facto segrega-
tion of Negro and Puerto Rican students in the new building. Under the
Blodnick plan the enrollment would have been fifty-two per cent Negro,
thirty-four per cent Puerto Rican, and fourteen per cent non-Puerto Rican
white.
The challenged zone was then formulated and adopted by the board
of education 2 with the result that school 275's enrollment would be ap-
proximately one-third Negro, one-third Puerto Rican, and one-third non-
Puerto Rican white. The children of the parents who contested the adopted
plan live within walking distance of new school 275, and no farther from
school 275 than from school 285, which they previously attended.3
The supreme court held that the adopted zone violated Education
Law section 3201,4 which provides that admission into or exclusion from
any public school in New York shall not depend upon race.5 The appellate
I The Blodnick plan was formulated by Dr. Blodnick, who is Assistant Superin-
tendent for Local School Districts 41 and 42. The junior high school involved here is
in District 42.
2 The adopted plan was formulated by Mr. Turner, who is Assistant Superin-
tendent of Schools and also head of the Central Zoning Unit. Turner modified Dr.
Blodnick's districting map by excluding a northerly area with a heavy Negro popula-
tion and including a predominantly white area. Petitioner's two children and some
forty-nine other white children on whose behalf this proceeding was brought reside
in the latter area.
3 The petitioning parents asserted that school 285 was in their residential neigh-
borhood, which contrasted with the part slum, part deteriorated residential area, and
part high-rise apartment neighborhood in which new Junior High School 275 was
built. All the children scheduled for admittance into school 275 were in their first year
of junior high school so that no one was transferred from one school to another.
4 N.Y. Educ. Law § 3201 provides, "No person shall be refused admission into or
be excluded from any public school in the state of New York on account of race,
creed, color, or national origin."
5 Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The
supreme court said "the inclusion of petitioners' children in the school zone approved
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division reversed, holding that section 3201 was not violated by requiring
white children to attend new Junior High School 275, where they live
closer to or no farther from the new school than from the old school; and
that the board of education has the power to consider race in delineating
a zone for a new school to prevent segregation in that school at its in-
ception.6 The court of appeals affirmed 7 and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari."
The issue involved in Balaban v. Rubin was narrowly construed by the
court of appeals to be whether a board of education may, not must, con-
sider, among other relevant matters, the factor of racial balance when
adopting a zoning plan for a school. The court of appeals did not discuss
whether there is an affirmative constitutional obligation to take action to
reduce de facto segregation. Despite the narrow ground of the holding, the
case is significant because it is one of the first cases in which the highest
court of a state has been confronted with an attempt by a school board
to reduce de facto segregation. 9 The decision in favor of the school board's
action and the subsequent denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court1 0 will provide strong support for good faith attempts by school
boards in New York and in other states to reduce de facto segregation.
In Brown v. Board of Educ.,"x the Supreme Court ruled that segrega-
tion of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
facilities 12 be equal, deprives the children of minority groups of equal
protection of the laws. Brown involved de jure segregation; therefore, the
Court did not then rule, nor has it yet ruled, on the constitutional issues of
de facto segregation.
The authority from lower court decisions concerning de facto segrega-
tion is conflicting. As far back as 1957, a federal court of appeals held in
Borders v. Rippy 18 that the equal protection and due process clauses of
the fourteenth amendment do not affirmatively command integration, but
for J.H.S. 275, upon the basis of their race, and their consequent exclusion from
J.H.S. 285, their traditional neighborhood school, and from other schools to which
they might have been assigned upon a lawful basis, was violative of the spirit and
intent of the statute." Id. at 252, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
6 Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App.Div.2d 438, 248 N.Y.S2d 574 (1964). The appellate
division's decision is discussed in 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 561 (1964).
7 Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E2d 375, 250 N.Y.S2d 281 (1964).
8 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
9 See Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A2d 97 (1964), decided one
week before the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Balaban. Morean cited the
appellate division's decision in Balaban.
10 Supra note 8.
11347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court said "that to separate Negro children from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority which affects their motivation to learn and has a tendency to retard
their mental development." Id. at 494.
12 Included in "facilities" would be the building, rooms, teachers and their salaries,
books, and financial resources.
Is 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
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only forbid state action requiring segregation because of race.14 This view
is supported by the majority of cases '5 and was adopted by the appellate
division in Balaban.16
Contrary to the majority view, the California Supreme Court hinted
in Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist.'7 that an affirmative duty does
exist on the part of school boards to reduce de facto segregation.'3 The
view opposite Jackson, supported by some authority, was advanced by
way of dictum in Bell v. School City of Gary.'9 This position is that the
school boards may not constitutionally consider race at all, whether they
intend to integrate or segregate 20 The middle ground between Jackson
and Bell, established by Balaban, is that while affirmative action by school
boards is not constitutionally required, it is not constitutionally forbidden.
School boards, according to Balaban, may consider the race of pupils in
delimiting school zones in attempting to avoid dominance by one race
in a school, but they do not have to consider race.
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF RACE
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Balaban discussed prici-
pally whether the plaintiffs' statutory rights under section 3201 of the
New York Education Law 2 were violated. The court reasoned that since
the adopted plan "excludes no one from any school and has no tendency
to foster or produce racial segregation,"' 22 section 3201 was in no way
violated. The court of appeals also said that there was no other legal
impediment to the adoption of the zoning plan.23 The court's statement
that the plan "excludes no one from any school" is true only if one infers
14 Id. at 271.
15 See Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964); Avery v. Wichita Falls, 241 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D.Del.
1962) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 161 F. Supp. 372, 378 (N.D. Ala
1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
16 Supra note 6, at 446, 248 N.Y.S2d at 581.
17 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). See 37 So. Cal. L. Rev.
350 (1964).
'S Id. at 881, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609: "The right to an equal oppor-
tunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that school
boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in
schools regardless of its cause."
The Jackson case, however, was on appeal from a lower court's decision sus-
taining a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition which alleged that the defendant school
board was guilty of intentional discrimination. Since the plaintiff alleged intentional
discrimination, the California Supreme Court needed only to rely on Brown to re-
verse the lower court's decision and return the case for trial. Therefore, the California
Supreme Court's language regarding an affirmative duty was dictum.
19 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aff'd, 324 F2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).20 Id. at 831.
21 Supra note 4.




that the court meant that no one was excluded from a school which he had
a right to attend-and, barring special circumstances, a child has a right to
attend only the school within his school district as legally determined by
the school board.24 The court then apparently relied on the legislative
purpose of Education Law section 3201 to conclude that the statute was
not violated. Section 3201 was enacted to repeal an old New York law 25
which had authorized separate schools for Negroes. Therefore, when the
court said that the zoning plan had no tendency to foster racial segregation,
it was referring to the legislative purpose of section 3201-the elimination
of segregation-and inferring that the section did not apply to attempted
integration.
After the court briefly dismissed the question of any violation of
section 3201, it held that the zoning decision by the board was not arbitrary
or unreasonable, but instead was within its power because (1) the board
had the statutory power to determine the school each pupil should attend;
(2) no child had to travel farther to new school 275 than he would have
had to travel to attend his neighborhood school; and (3) no oppressive
results existed. 26
Nowhere in the majority's opinion are possible federal or New York
constitutional issues mentioned or discussed. The court did, however, inti-
mate that it considered constitutional issues by its statement, "nor was
there any other legal impediment to [the school zone's] adoption." 27
The brief opinion's tacit avoidance of constitutional issues did not,
however, discourage Judge Van Voorhis from vigorous dissent. The dis-
sent argued, first, that the principle of anti-discrimination and the mandates
of the fourteenth amendment and the New York Constitution 8 require each
person to be treated without regard to race, religion, or national origin; 29
second, that if Negroes can legally be admitted to schools because they are
Negroes, they can be excluded for the same reason; 30 and third, if school
children can be admitted because they are Negroes, they can also be
admitted because they are Aryans, Roman Catholics, Anglo-Saxons,
Jews, and so on.31 Judge Van Voorhis stated further that "it would be
hopeless for any school board or other governing body to try to assemble
an ideal amalgam by admitting the right quotas or other proportions of
cultural, religious, or ethnic groups." 32
2 4 Balaban v. Rubin, mpra note 6, at 443, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
25 New York Laws 1894, ch. 556, tit.15, § 28.
26 Supra note 7, at 199, 199 N.E.2d at 377-78, 250 N.Y.S2d at 284.
2 7 Id. at 199, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
28 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 11: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or
subdivision of the state."
29 Supra note 7, at 199, 199 N.E2d at 378, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 285 (dissenting
opinion).
301d. at 200, 199 N.E2d at 378, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 285 (dissenting opinion).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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The second argument of the dissent is without merit,33 and, although
the third argument may have some practical merit in connection with the
simple administration practice of "balanced" schools, it has slight legal
merit because it overgeneralizes. The federal constitution does not require
that state regulation reach at once every class to which it might be
applied. 34 Therefore, assuming that race, religion, and nationality can be
considered when integrating, even if the dissenter's third proposition
is true, the board's consideration of only Negroes in an attempt to balance
the new school does not invalidate the ruling and does not violate the
equal protection clause. But it can, however, be argued that the third
proposition is not true, for regulation may recognize degrees of evil without
being arbitrary or in conflict with the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.3 5 Hence, if it can be shown that the Negro segregation
problem is so unique, so inequitable, as to deserve special regulation, then
the third proposition would not be true.
The dissent's proposition that the fourteenth amendment requires that
each person be treated without regard to his color, religion, or creed, is
constitutionally the most significant. This proposition puts in issue con-
flicting fourteenth amendment interpretations concerning whether race can
be considered when attempting to integrate public schools. The conflict is
between the argument that race per se cannot constitutionally be considered
at all by states and the argument that the fourteenth amendment only re-
quires that there be a legally sufficient legislative purpose before a state
may properly consider race. The United States Supreme Court has not
yet stated which of the interpretations, if either, it considers correct with
respect to the elimination of de facto segregation in public schools.
The equal protection clause was not intended to interfere with the
power of the state to prescribe regulations to promote health, peace, morals,
education, and the good order of the state.36 Persons may be classified for
legislative purposes provided such classifications are (1) reasonable and
necessary for the purpose of the legislation,37 (2) based on proper and
justifiable distinctions, considering the purpose of the law, and (3) not
clearly arbitrary. 38 Before Brown, classification according to race was
permitted.39 The test for determining the validity of a racial classification
was laid down in Korematsu v. United States.40 In holding that Korematsu,
33 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and subsequent school segre-
gation cases leave no doubt that Negroes cannot be legally excluded from schools solely
because they are Negroes. The dissenter does not in his opinion support the statement
that if Negroes can be admitted because they are Negroes, they can be excluded for
the same reason.
34 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948); Chicago Dock & Canal Co.
v. Fraley, 228 U.S. 680, 687 (1913).
35 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
36 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
37 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
38 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
39 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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an American citizen of Japanese descent, had not been unconstitutionally
convicted for remaining in a military area in contravention of a Civilian
Exclusion Order, the Court stated that:
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil right of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonisms never can.4 '
Since the Brown decision, a per se argument has found support in
some of the school integration cases.42 The Brown decision itself is con-
sidered by some to have established a per se rule forbidding any classifica-
tion by race whatever.43 Several per curiam decisions 44 by the Supreme
Court since Brown have made at least one commentator wonder whether
the Supreme Court is approaching a per se rule.45 Despite this authority to
the contrary, the nearly universal belief is that the Brown decision itself
did not declare that the fourteenth amendment forbids all racial distinc-
tions in legislation.46 The Court's heavy emphasis on the feelings of in-
feriority engendered by compulsory segregation indicates that the Court
considered segregation in public schools solely on the basis of race to be
unreasonable and unrelated to any proper governmental purpose and,
therefore, a denial of equal protection, but not on a per se basis.47
On the same day that Brown was decided, the Supreme Court ruled in
Bolling v. Sharpe48 that segregation in the public schools of Washington,
D.C., was a denial of due process in violation of the fifth amendment 49
because such segregation was unrelated to any proper governmental objec-
tive. Since the equal protection clause does not apply to the District of
Columbia, the Supreme Court applied the fifth amendment's due process
41 Id. at 216.
42 Bell v. School City of Gary, sumra note 19, at 831. See also the lower court
decision in Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S2d 973 (1963).
43 See Blaustein & Ferguson, Desegregation and the Law 145 (1957).
44 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958),
affirming per curiam 252 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956), affirming per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala. 1956) ; Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), reversing per curiam 223 F2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955);
Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affirming per curiam 220
F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954), reversing per curiam 202 F2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
45 See Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv. L,
Rev. 1, 22, 32 (1959).
40 Id. at 32; See Hellerstein, "The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and The Rule
In Shelly's Case," 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 531 (1963).
4 7 Hellerstein, supra note 46.
48 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
49 U.S. Const. amend. V.
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clause. The Court implied, however, that the fifth amendment's due process
clause and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause are closely
related in their reqirements concerning racial classifications."0 The Court
in Boiling substantiated the conclusion that a per se rule was not intended
to be adopted by referring to Korematsu v. United States 51 and its proposi-
tion that racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect."
5 2
An analysis of the recent case of Anderson v. Martin 53 suggests that
the Court since Brown and Boiling still is not adopting a per se rule. In
Anderson, Negro candidates for election to a Louisiana parish school
board filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of a Louisiana statute which
required that in all primary, general, or special elections, the nomination
papers and ballots should designate the race of the candidate. The Supreme
Court held that Louisiana's compulsory designation on the ballot of
candidates' races operated as a discrimination against the claimants and
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 4 The
Court reasoned that the vice of the statute lay in placing the power of
the state behind a racial classification that tended to induce racial prejudice
at the polls.55 The Court, apparently looking into the legislature's motive,
further reasoned that since that statute was not enacted until 1960, when
private attitudes towards Negroes were hostile, the enactment could only
result in a "repressive effect." 56 The Court then concluded that the
challenged provision could not be deemed reasonably designed to meet
legitimate governmental interests in informing the electorate of its candi-
dates, since there was no relationship between the state's designation of
race and the candidate's qualifications for office:
Nor can the attacked provision be deemed to be reasonably de-
signed to meet legitimate governmental interests in informing the
50 Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 48, at 500: "In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,
it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution wound impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government."
51 Supra note 40.
52 Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 48, at 499: "Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect."
53 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
54 Id. at 401-02.
55 The Court stated:
[B]y placing a racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in the
electoral process-the instant before the vote is cast-the State furnishes a vehicle
by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group
because of race for another. This is true because by directing the citizen's attention
to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a candidate's
race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's
choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial
lines.
Id. at 402.
56 Id. at 403.
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electorate as to candidates. We see no relevance in the States'
pointing up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifica-
tion for office. Indeed, this factor in itself "underscores the purely
racial character and purpose" of the statute.57
It might be argued that the facts in Anderson do not support the
Court's finding that racial prejudice was encouraged by the Louisiana
statute, but the legal basis upon which the Court rested its decision is
unarguably clear-no legitimate governmental interest existed to justify
the racial classification. If the Court were using a per se rule that racial
classifications are illegal, it would not have had to reason that a vice
existed in the statute and that a legitimate governmental interest was
lacking. Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court still considers that
the equal protection clause does not per se forbid racial classifications and
that the "rigid scrutiny" test of Korematsu 58 is still to be applied to
determine the presence of racial antagonisms.59
The recent Supreme Court decision in Tancil v. Woolls 60 substantiates
the conclusion that under proper circumstances race may be considered
by a state. In Tancil, the Supreme Court, without opinion, affirmed a
federal district court's decision upholding a Virginia statute which re-
quired the designation of the races of the parties in divorce records.61 The
district court had reasoned that the designation of race in divorce records
serves useful purposes in providing information which aids identification
and in the compilation of useful statistics. 2
If it be true that the "proper legislative purpose" rule and not the
per se rule is the constitutional test for racial classifications, the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in Balaban could be legally justified
by reasoning in the following way: (1) the state, when seeking to provide
and require compulsory public education, must do so as equally as is
feasible, 3 (2) a Negro in a de facto segregated, predominantly Negro
school receives an inherently unequal education, (3) therefore, the state
has a legitimate governmental purpose in considering race along with
other material factors when delineating school zones in order to reduce
inherent inequality. Consequently, no unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws is involved in "balancing" schools.
57 Ibid.
58 Supra note 40, at 216.
59 The denial of certiorari in Balaban might imply that the fourteenth amendment
does not require a per se rule concerning racial classifications.
60379 U.S. 19 (1964), afflrming per curiam 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964).
61 Va. Code Ann. § 20-101 (1950): "Any interlocutory or final decree granting
a divorce a mensa et thoro or a vinculo matrimonii, as the case may be, shall contain
a recital showing the race of the husband and wife; but the failure of such decree to
contain such recital shall not affect the validity of such decree or divorce"'
62 Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va.
1964).
63 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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RAMIFICATIONS
Though the Balaban case did not involve any "bussing" of students,
cases in the future will. With the use of neighborhood school districts in
any school system with a large and expanding percentage of Negro
population, a racial inbalance will occur in certain schools. The question
then arises concerning the degree to which the Balaban principle will be
extended. If a Negro neighborhood school and a white neighborhood school
are not in close proximity as the schools were in Balaban, should a school
board be permitted to bus students from a predominantly Negro section
of town to a predominantly white section? 6 In Strippoli v. Bickal,6 5 a
case now on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the appellate divi-
sion held that the school board could bus students from a badly over-
crowded Negro neighborhood school to a new, partially vacant white
neighborhood school, even though racial balance was one of the motivating
reasons. The appellate division, relying on Balaban, reasoned that a transfer
of students was needed because of the overcrowded conditions in the
Negro neighborhood school; therefore, the consideration of racial balance
in connection with the transfer did not invalidate the otherwise reasonable
transfer.
Another New York Appellate Division decision, Di Sano v. Storandt,66
also upheld a school board's plan which involved "bussing." The plan in
Di Sano designated as "sending" schools a number of schools having a
high percentage of non-white students, and as "receiving" schools a number
of schools with unused classroom space and a non-white student enroll-
ment less than the city average. For the purpose of reducing racial im-
balance, Negro students enrolled in the sending schools were permitted
to transfer to receiving schools upon request for transfer by their parents. 7
64 Wechsler, supra note 45, at 33, said that the judgment in Brown "must have
rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the
minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant politically
and, therefore, does not make the choice involved." On this basis, if the Negroes in a
community are a minority of the population and decide that they want to be segre-
gated from the whites and are then segregated, there would be no violation of equal
protection.
6521 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964), reversing 42 Misc. 2d 475, 248
N.Y.S.2d 588 (1964).66
- App.Div.2d-, 253 N.Y.S2d (1964), reversing 43 Misc. 2d 272, 250 N.Y.S2d
701 (1964).
67For the reaction of some parents see U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 26.
1964, p. 71; Time, Oct. 16, 1964, p. 98. Besides constitutional problems, a school board
before acting to reduce de facto segregation must consider the expense involved. There
was testimony in Bell v. School City of Gary, supra note 15, that under the plaintiff's
plan at least 6,000 pupils would have to be transported on each school day, pre-
sumably by bus, and that the cost of operating one bus was twenty dollars per day.
The transportation of students would be a matter of considerable concern to the
administrators of an already heavily taxed and indebted school district. Moreover,
the administrative problem of choosing those students to be transferred and those
[Vol. 26
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Should a school board decide to transport students, one plan which
could be used is the Princeton Plan. Under this plan, two schools are
paired-one predominantly white and the other predominantly Negro--
and children attend one school for several years (for example, for the first
three grades) and the other school for the remainder of the years (the last
three grades).68
Another possible plan for the integration of public schools, a quota
system, was called unconstitutional in dictum by the appellate division in
Balaban.69 The plaintiffs in Balaban contended that the plan adopted by
the school board was a quota system. The appellate division, while sug-
gesting that such a system would be constitutionally invalid, was quick to
differentiate the Balaban plan from a quota system. A school quota system,
which is similar to the housing "benign quota," 70 is a system which fixes
a ratio in terms of race for the attendance of schools. The attendance in
schools under such a system is controlled to maintain a fixed ratio between
different races for an indefinite period of time. The basis of a quota
system is the avoidance of the so-called "tipping-point." The "tipping-point"
is the theoretical maximum minority group proportion which whites will
tolerate in a given school. As the whites become accustomed to the Negroes'
presence, the proportion of Negroes is increased until the desired racial
balance is achieved. Since the status quo is maintained until it is felt that
the whites will tolerate more Negroes, Negroes or whites in the school's
district in excess of the quota are sent to another school. A white student
will not be permitted to enter a school under a quota system unless another
white, previously enrolled in the school in the same grade, has left. The
same procedure is applied to Negroes seeking enrollment.
The appellate division implied that the individual racial exclusion of
Negroes or whites otherwise eligible to attend the school in their residential
district makes the quota system constitutionally repugnant. The plan
adopted in Balaban was not held a quota system, because Negroes and
whites moving into the new school zone were to be able to attend the
school regardless of the effect on the existing proportion of whites and
non-whites and regardless of whether any whites or non-whites had moved
out of the zone. In the future, if a school quota system is to be used and
upheld, it must be shown that the so-called "tipping-point" exists and
that whites will gradually accept a larger percentage of Negroes in the
schools. Most importantly, it will also have to be shown that the quota
system's purpose, the gradual inclusion of the Negro, is sufficently related
to a proper governmental purpose (the elimination of de facto segregation)
to justify the exclusion of students from a school solely because of
their race.
not to be transferred in a growing school system would be burdensome, as would be
the reaction of many parents.68 Note, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 561, 563 n.14 (1964). A modification of the Prince-
ton Plan was upheld in Vetere v. Mitchell, 21 App.Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S2d 480
(1964).
O6 Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App.Div. 2d 438, 448, 248 N.Y.S2d 574, 584 (1964).
70 For a discussion of the housing benign quota, see Hellerstein, supra note 46.
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CONCLUSION
As the law stands after the Balaban case, the decision to reduce de
facto segregation is left to the school boards and to the parents and voters
involved. School boards still have no affirmative duty to integrate, but
may, in selecting the geographic zone for a school, consider racial factors
along with other relevant criteria, in order to prevent racially segregated
schools. The neighborhood school plan is still constitutional, and school
systems developed on a neighborhood plan, which are honestly constructed
with no intention to segregate races, need not be destroyed because of
racial imbalance in certain schools where districts are populated almost
entirely by Negroes or whites.
It is the opinion of this writer that the courts should not require an
affirmative duty on the part of school boards to reduce de facto segrega-
tion, nor should they forbid such a reduction. Though there is sufficient
public interest and legislative purpose to justify the consideration of race
by boards which act to eliminate de facto segregation, the inequality of
de facto segregation is not caused by state action, but by private discrimina-
tion in housing.71 The equal protection clause does not require the state
to make amends for private discrimination. Further, if the citizens of a
school district or state through their school officials decide in good faith
that their schools should be racially balanced, the federal constitution should
be no bar. If the citizens disagree with their school officials' good-faith
attempts to integrate their schools, the citizens' remedy should be at the
polls, not in the courts.
7.1 Hellerstein, supra note 46; Note, "Racial Discrimination in Housing," 107
U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1959).
